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The Frege point to the effect that e.g. the clauses of conditionals are not asserted and 
therefore cannot be assertions is often taken to establish a dichotomy between the content of a 
speech act, which is propositional and belongs to logic and semantics, and its force, which 
belongs to pragmatics. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as 
Peter Hanks and Francois Recanati, who propose act-theoretic accounts of propositions, 
argue that we can’t account for propositional unity independently of the forceful acts of 
speakers, and respond to the Frege point by appealing to a notion of force cancellation. I 
argue that the notion of force cancellation is faced with a dilemma and offer an alternative 
response to the Frege point, which extends the act-theoretic account to logical acts such as 
conditionalizing or disjoining. Such higher-level acts allow us to present forceful acts while 
suspending commitment to them. In connecting them, a subject rather commits to an 
affirmation function of such acts. In contrast, the Frege point confuses a lack of commitment 
to what is put forward with a lack of commitment or force in what is put forward. 
 
What is the relation between propositions and acts like judging, asserting or ordering? A very 
influential tradition takes them to be fundamentally different in kind: propositions are 
forceless and only provide the content of forceful acts. Some even think that acts like 
assertions and orders can share the same content, so that, for example, the same proposition 
might be asserted to be true or ordered to be made true. At the same time propositions are 
typically seen as the fundamental truth value bearers and as the entities that logical operations 
are performed on. Accordingly, propositions are taken to belong to the subject matter of logic 
and semantics, but forceful acts to that of pragmatics. 
 What Peter Geach (1965: 449) called the “Frege point” has been enormously 
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influential in establishing this force-content dichotomy: “… a proposition may occur in 
discourse now asserted, now unasserted; and yet be recognizably the same proposition.” 
From the fact that e.g. the clauses of a conditional (or a disjunction) are not asserted, the 
Frege point concludes that they are not assertions either. It’s only the conditional as a whole 
that is asserted or judged to be true. Therefore, the minor premise and the conclusion of a 
modus ponens argument such as (1) cannot be assertions either on pain of equivocation. 
 
(1) If it rains, the street gets wet. 
It rains. 
 The street gets wet. 
 
They must rather be forceless, viz. “propositions”. As influential as the Frege point has been 
and as obvious it may seem initially, in this paper I will argue that it is fallacious and offer an 
alternative account. It’s true that a subject who accepts a conditional like (1) thereby neither 
asserts that it rains, nor that the street gets wet. But it does not follow that these clauses are 
not assertions. They are, but the subject has performed a higher-level act of connecting them, 
which commits it to what I will call an “affirmation function” of the clauses rather than to the 
clauses themselves. In affirming the conditional, it neither commits to the antecedent nor to 
the consequent, but only to affirming the consequent, should it affirm the antecedent. The 
Frege point confuses a lack of commitment to a clause with a lack of commitment in it, that 
is, with a lack of assertive force. 
Let me begin arguing for this proposal and developing it further by comparing it to 
recent suggestions by Scott Soames, Peter Hanks and Francois Recanati. These philosophers 
all want to naturalize propositions by reconceptualizing them in act-theoretic terms and 
propose that acts of predication tie the proposition together. Soames’s (2015) version 
preserves the dichotomy of force and content. He suggests we can predicate a property of an 
object without commitment to the truth of a proposition, for example, in imagination or 
hypothesis. This would be a further step we would take in asserting its truth, or in 
acknowledging or endorsing it. Hanks (2015) strongly criticizes this proposal, charging that 
the idea that we could ascribe a property to an object without thereby taking a position with 
regard to whether it actually has that property is incoherent. Anything that bears a truth value 
must involve such a position and thus must have force. The traditional separation of 
propositions as truth value bearers from force is therefore untenable. 
This argument is powerful, but it forces Hanks to challenge the Frege point head-on. 
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How can propositions have force and yet occur unasserted as in conditionals and 
disjunctions? Hanks proposes that in such cases force gets “cancelled” and introduces a sign 
for cancellation. A “pure”, free-standing, act of predication counts as an assertion, but if such 
an act is performed in special contexts such as those created by certain connectives, or by 
fiction, its assertive force is cancelled. Recanati (2016) instead proposes an account that 
appeals to R. M. Hare’s (1971) distinction between tropic and neustic force. The tropic 
indicates the difference between e.g. an assertion and an order. The neustic symbolizes the 
speaker’s “subscription” to a clause and is accordingly removed from the logical 
representation of the clauses of conditionals and disjunctions. 
Traditional Fregean accounts, including Soames’s act-theoretic version, can be called 
“plus”-accounts. They assume that propositions are as such forceless, but that force is added 
in certain contexts by acts of assertion or judgment, indicated by Frege’s judgement stroke. In 
contrast, Hanks and Recanati propose “minus”-accounts. Their basic entities are forceful, but 
force or components of it are subtracted in certain contexts. But, I will argue now, regardless 
of this difference, they are subject to the same dilemma. Either the judgment stroke, or the 
signs for force cancellation or neustic force, make a contribution to meaning and to the 
validity of inferences, or they do not. If they do, they make the wrong kind of contribution. 
This is the first horn of the dilemma. 
To see this, add symbols for force cancellation or neustic force to (1). These symbols 
will indicate that the (neustic) force of the antecedent and the consequent is removed, but that 
of the minor premise and the conclusion is not. But this means that if these symbols make a 
contribution to meaning and validity, they will invalidate modus ponens because both 
statements will once appear with their (neustic) force removed in the conditional and once 
with their (neustic) force intact in the minor premise and the conclusion. The same is true for 
Frege’s judgement stroke, which will be added to the minor premise and the conclusion, but 
only to the conditional as a whole, not to its clauses. So let us opt for saying that these signs 
make no difference to meaning and validity (as does Hanks 2016) – that they are logically 
meaningless, as Wittgenstein said about the judgment stroke (TLP, 4.442). 
On this horn of the dilemma, the symbols turn out to be redundant. At best they 
indicate something that has already been indicated by other symbols, viz. the connectives. 
This should be obvious from the fact that where the signs are put is entirely determined 
through the connectives: e.g. the force of the clauses of conditionals and disjunctions gets 
cancelled, but that of the conjuncts of a conjunction does not. It is entirely a matter of 
whether the clauses are entailed by the whole complex or not. 
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It is really the connectives which are doing the work here and this is why I propose to 
extend the act-theoretical framework to logical acts of connecting, e.g. of disjoining or 
conditionalizing. Through such acts, the subject commits to certain affirmation functions of 
the connected clauses such as the conditional, but not necessarily to these clauses themselves. 
This is sufficient to explain why a subject that accepts our conditional in (1) does not assert 
that it rains. There is a temptation to think that there must be further difference between the 
‘asserted’ and ‘unasserted’ occurrences beyond the presence of the connective, but, as we 
have seen, all attempts of both the plus and the minus variety to specify this difference only 
lead and can only lead to something logically idle and redundant. Therefore, there is no 
“neustic” force. What Hare called “tropic” force, what distinguishes e.g. assertions from 
orders, is all the force there is. And force in this sense does make a difference to the validity 
of arguments. For example, “Make it rain!” can’t detach the antecedent in our argument (1). 
To complete our response to the Frege point, we need to understand force, and that means we 
have to understand assertive force in contradistinction to the force of orders and other 
directive speech acts. I will just be concerned with generic assertive and directive force, not 
with the differences between, say, guesses and statements, or commands and requests and 
will use “assertion” and “order” with such generic meanings.  
I propose to understand force in terms of a representation of the theoretical or 
practical position a subject takes up with regard to a state of affairs. In stating or asserting 
that it rains, the subject takes a stand or position with regard to the reality of this state of 
affairs (SOA). The subject takes theoretical, epistemic responsibility for this reality, it affirms 
it from a theoretical position. I submit that it is also aware of this position and indicates it. 
Through grammatical mood, intonation and other force indicators, it presents itself as having 
some form of epistemic, cognitive access to this SOA, perhaps even as knowing it, and thus 
undertakes a theoretical commitment to its reality. In ordering something, a subject takes a 
practical position towards the reality of a SOA. It takes practical responsibility for its 
realization. It affirms it from a practical position and undertakes a practical commitment to it. 
And again, it is aware of doing so and indicates its position through force indicators. 
Now suppose a practical and a theoretical position are taken towards the same SOA. 
For example, you may have ordered me to close the door and now state that I have done so. 
You first represent this SOA as a goal and then as a fact. The order and the statement share 
content representing this same action, but can this content be the supposedly forceless and at 
the same time truth-evaluable proposition of the traditional conception? No. What is shared is 
mere representation of a SOA, but such a representation “is not yet a move in the language 
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game”, as Wittgenstein put it (PI, §22; his italics) in commenting on Frege’s notion of 
thought. To become such a move of the truth-evaluable kind it needs to be connected to a 
theoretical position, as truth is representational success from a theoretical position. The 
shared content is essentially incomplete and can only become the bearer of a truth or other 
satisfaction value by adding a theoretical or practical position. 
I have claimed that this position is added by representing it. Different, e.g. 
functionalist, normativist or expressivist accounts of force are possible and have of course 
been given, but I believe that on reflection, the representationalist proposal is intuitively 
plausible. Compare representing the same SOA as a goal or as a fact. There is certainly a 
difference in being aware of something as a fact or as a goal, and a difference between the 
subject’s positions, so it is natural to think that the former consists in an awareness of the 
latter. (For additional arguments, see Schmitz (2018)). 
For present purposes, it is crucial how this proposal can dissolve the problem raised 
by Frege and make sense of the inference patterns we find. In the basic case of a free-
standing assertion or order, a subject represents the position she at the same time takes or 
reaffirms. But e.g. in conditionals a subject considers a SOA before being in the position of 
asserting its occurrence, typically in order to decide what else would be the case then, or what 
to do in this eventuality. If in response to uttering our conditional (1), somebody claimed I 
had asserted that it rains, I would be right to respond “I only said ‘if’!”. But the SOA of it 
raining is still considered from a theoretical position, as a (possible) fact. That is why 
affirming its reality by the order to make it rain cannot detach the antecedent, even though if 
the order were executed, the antecedent would be true. But this needs to be determined, and it 
can only be determined from a theoretical position. That is why the theoretical position is 
represented in the antecedent, and why only taking such a position by an assertion can detach 
it. In the conditional, however, this position is not yet taken, but only represented, because by 
conditionalizing the subject commits to an affirmation function of the clauses rather than to 
the clauses themselves. That’s why it is right to respond “I only said ‘if’!”. It commits to 
affirming the consequent should it also affirm the antecedent, that is, take the position 
represented in the antecedent. 
To take stock, force must be part of clauses because a) anything that has a truth or 
other satisfaction value must involve a commitment to the reality of the represented SOA, 
and b) force makes a difference to the validity of inferences. But this is consistent with the 
fact that e.g. the antecedent of a conditional is not asserted because the subject is not 
committed to this antecedent, but only to one of its affirmation functions. We only need to 
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distinguish between the commitment in the clause – the theoretical or practical commitment 
to the reality of a SOA – from the commitment to the clause indicated by the connectives. 
The representation of a theoretical or practical position in the clause which embodies 
commitment to the reality of a SOA is always there, it is just that the subject may not be 
committed to this position, because it is not committed to the clause in which it is 
represented. In contrast, the Frege point fails to distinguish these different kinds of 
commitment and in effect attempts to infer the absence of commitment and thus of force in 
the clause from the absence of commitment to the clause. 
Hanks and Recanati are therefore right that the basic entities are forceful. But what 
the notion of force cancellation tries to capture can be entirely accounted for in terms of 
additional acts of conditionalizing or disjoining. Analogous accounts can be given of other 
contexts often appealed to in this connection such as fictional or interrogative contexts. These 
contexts can be understood in terms of additional higher-level acts such as questioning an 
assertion or order, or of pretending to question, assert or order. Just like acts of logical 
connection, these acts allow us to present forceful acts while suspending commitment to them 
(cf. Schmitz, manuscript).  
Let me conclude with a couple of clarifications concerning the notion of connecting 
acts through affirmation functions. A frequent misunderstanding is to think that such 
connections would be commitments to perform acts, such that by affirming our conditional in 
(1) one would commit to perform the act of asserting that the street gets wet if it rains. But 
the relevant act has already been performed. By affirming the conditional, the subject has 
connected the positions so that, if it affirms the antecedent, it is committed to the consequent 
position rather than to the act of taking this position – though of course it may be asked to 
reaffirm its commitment. The position a subject takes or the connection between positions 
that it makes can be seen as the product of the processes or acts of taking and connecting 
positions. In the sense of this familiar distinction, we can say that logic is concerned with the 
positions that are taken rather than with the acts of taking them, because when, where, why 
and by whom positions are taken is inessential to logic. 
I speak of affirmation functions rather than of truth functions to gesture towards a 
conceptualization of logic which can deal with practical positions just as well as with 
theoretical, truth-valuable ones. The basic idea is very simple, namely that logic is essentially 
about the yes-no polarity of affirmation and negation and that this polarity is more 
fundamental than the polarity of truth and falsity, which is just a special case of this polarity, 
the case where the affirmed or negated item is a truth-value bearer. That is, to affirm a 
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statement or assertion is to affirm its truth, while to affirm an order, promise or intention is to 
affirm its realization. On this way of thinking, logic is about affirmation-functional 
connections between positions regardless of whether these bear truth or other satisfaction 
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